elasticsearch/docs/reference/modules/scripting/security.asciidoc

[[modules-scripting-security]]
=== Scripting and security

You should never run Elasticsearch as the `root` user, as this would allow a
script to access or do *anything* on your server, without limitations.

You should not expose Elasticsearch directly to users, but instead have a
proxy application inbetween. If you *do* intend to expose Elasticsearch
directly to your users, then you have to decide whether you trust them enough
to run scripts on your box or not, and apply the appropriate safety measures.

[[enable-dynamic-scripting]]
[float]
=== Enabling dynamic scripting

The `script.*` settings allow for <<security-script-fine,fine-grained>>
control of which script languages (e.g `groovy`, `painless`) are allowed to
run in which context ( e.g. `search`, `aggs`, `update`), and where the script
source is allowed to come from (i.e. `inline`, `stored`, `file`).

For instance, the following setting enables `stored` `update` scripts for
`groovy`:

[source,yaml]
----------------
script.engine.groovy.inline.update: true
----------------

Less fine-grained settings exist which allow you to enable or disable scripts
for all sources, all languages, or all contexts.  The following settings
enable `inline` and `stored` scripts for all languages in all contexts:

[source,yaml]
-----------------------------------
script.inline: true
script.stored: true
-----------------------------------

WARNING:  The above settings mean that anybody who can send requests to your
Elasticsearch instance can run whatever scripts they choose! This is a
security risk and may well lead to your Elasticsearch cluster being
compromised.

[[security-script-source]]
[float]
=== Script source settings

Scripts may be enabled or disabled depending on their source: `inline`,
`stored` in the cluster state, or from a `file` on each node in the cluster.
Each of these settings takes one of these values:


[horizontal]
`false`::   Scripting is enabled.
`true`::    Scripting is disabled.

The default values are the following:

[source,yaml]
-----------------------------------
script.inline: false
script.stored: false
script.file:   true
-----------------------------------

NOTE: Global scripting settings affect the `mustache` scripting language.
<<search-template,Search templates>> internally use the `mustache` language, and
will be disabled by default, but they can be enabled/disabled according to
fine-grained settings specified in `elasticsearch.yml`.

[[security-script-context]]
[float]
=== Script context settings

Scripting may also be enabled or disabled in different contexts in the
Elasticsearch API. The supported contexts are:

[horizontal]
`aggs`::    Aggregations
`search`::  Search api, Percolator API and Suggester API
`update`::  Update api
`plugin`::  Any plugin that makes use of scripts under the generic `plugin` category

Plugins can also define custom operations that they use scripts for instead
of using the generic `plugin` category. Those operations can be referred to
in the following form: `${pluginName}_${operation}`.

The following example disables scripting for `update` and `plugin` operations,
regardless of the script source or language. Scripts can be executed from
languages as part of `aggregations`, `search` and plugins execution though,
assuming they are enabled in the scripting settings.

[source,yaml]
-----------------------------------
script.update: false
script.plugin: false
-----------------------------------

[[security-script-fine]]
[float]
=== Fine-grained script settings

First, the high-level script settings described above are applied in order
(context settings have precedence over source settings).  Then,  fine-grained
settings which include the script language take precedence over any high-level
settings.

Fine-grained settings have the form:

[source,yaml]
------------------------
script.engine.{lang}.{source}.{context}: true|false
------------------------

And

[source,yaml]
------------------------
script.engine.{lang}.{inline|file|stored}: true|false
------------------------

For example:

[source,yaml]
-----------------------------------
script.inline: false <1>
script.stored: false <1>
script.file:   false <1>

script.engine.groovy.inline:          true <2>
script.engine.groovy.stored.search:   true <3>
script.engine.groovy.stored.aggs:     true <3>

script.engine.mustache.stored.search: true <4>
-----------------------------------
<1> Disable all scripting from any source.
<2> Allow inline Groovy scripts for all operations
<3> Allow stored Groovy scripts to be used for search and aggregations.
<4> Allow stored Mustache templates to be used for search.

[[java-security-manager]]
[float]
=== Java Security Manager

Elasticsearch runs with the https://docs.oracle.com/javase/tutorial/essential/environment/security.html[Java Security Manager]
enabled by default.  The security policy in Elasticsearch locks down the
permissions granted to each class to the bare minimum required to operate.
The benefit of doing this is that it severely limits the attack vectors
available to a hacker.

Restricting permissions is particularly important with scripting languages
like Groovy and Javascript which are designed to do anything that can be done
in Java itself, including writing to the file system, opening sockets to
remote servers, etc.

[float]
=== Script Classloader Whitelist

Scripting languages are only allowed to load classes which appear in a
hardcoded whitelist that can be found in
https://github.com/elastic/elasticsearch/blob/{branch}/core/src/main/java/org/elasticsearch/script/ClassPermission.java[`org.elasticsearch.script.ClassPermission`].


In a script, attempting to load a class that does not appear in the whitelist
_may_ result in a `ClassNotFoundException`, for instance this script:

[source,json]
------------------------------
GET _search
{
  "script_fields": {
    "the_hour": {
      "script": "use(java.math.BigInteger); new BigInteger(1)"
    }
  }
}
------------------------------

will return the following exception:

[source,json]
------------------------------
{
  "reason": {
    "type": "script_exception",
    "reason": "failed to run inline script [use(java.math.BigInteger); new BigInteger(1)] using lang [groovy]",
    "caused_by": {
      "type": "no_class_def_found_error",
      "reason": "java/math/BigInteger",
      "caused_by": {
        "type": "class_not_found_exception",
        "reason": "java.math.BigInteger"
      }
    }
  }
}
------------------------------

However, classloader issues may also result in more difficult to interpret
exceptions.  For instance, this script:

[source,groovy]
------------------------------
use(groovy.time.TimeCategory); new Date(123456789).format('HH')
------------------------------

Returns the following exception:

[source,json]
------------------------------
{
  "reason": {
    "type": "script_exception",
    "reason": "failed to run inline script [use(groovy.time.TimeCategory); new Date(123456789).format('HH')] using lang [groovy]",
    "caused_by": {
      "type": "missing_property_exception",
      "reason": "No such property: groovy for class: 8d45f5c1a07a1ab5dda953234863e283a7586240"
    }
  }
}
------------------------------

[float]
== Dealing with Java Security Manager issues

If you encounter issues with the Java Security Manager, you have two options
for resolving these issues:

[float]
=== Fix the security problem

The safest and most secure long term solution is to change the code causing
the security issue.  We recognise that this may take time to do correctly and
so we provide the following two alternatives.

[float]
=== Customising the classloader whitelist

The classloader whitelist can be customised by tweaking the local Java
Security Policy either:

* system wide: `$JAVA_HOME/lib/security/java.policy`,
* for just the `elasticsearch` user: `/home/elasticsearch/.java.policy`
* by adding a system property to the <<sysconfig,es-java-opts>> configuration: `-Djava.security.policy=someURL`, or
* via the `ES_JAVA_OPTS` environment variable with `-Djava.security.policy=someURL`:
+
[source,js]
---------------------------------
export ES_JAVA_OPTS="${ES_JAVA_OPTS} -Djava.security.policy=file:///path/to/my.policy`
./bin/elasticsearch
---------------------------------

Permissions may be granted at the class, package, or global level.  For instance:

[source,js]
----------------------------------
grant {
    permission org.elasticsearch.script.ClassPermission "java.util.Base64"; // allow class
    permission org.elasticsearch.script.ClassPermission "java.util.*"; // allow package
    permission org.elasticsearch.script.ClassPermission "*"; // allow all (disables filtering basically)
};
----------------------------------

Here is an example of how to enable the `groovy.time.TimeCategory` class:

[source,js]
----------------------------------
grant {
    permission org.elasticsearch.script.ClassPermission "java.lang.Class";
    permission org.elasticsearch.script.ClassPermission "groovy.time.TimeCategory";
};
----------------------------------

[TIP]
======================================

Before adding classes to the whitelist, consider the security impact that it
will have on Elasticsearch. Do you really need an extra class or can your code
be rewritten in a more secure way?

It is quite possible that we have not whitelisted a generically useful and
safe class. If you have a class that you think should be whitelisted by
default, please open an issue on GitHub and we will consider the impact of
doing so.

======================================

See http://docs.oracle.com/javase/7/docs/technotes/guides/security/PolicyFiles.html for more information.